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Abstract: 
We develop a utility based model of fluctuations, with nominal rigidities, and unemployment. 
In doing so, we combine two strands of research: the New Keynesian model with its focus on 
nominal rigidities, and the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model, with its focus on labor 
market frictions and unemployment. In developing this model, we proceed in two steps. We 
first leave nominal rigidities aside. We show that, under a standard utility specification, 
productivity shocks have no effect on unemployment in the constrained efficient allocation. 
We then focus on the implications of alternative real wage setting mechanisms for 
fluctuations in unemployment. We then introduce nominal rigidities in the form of staggered 
price setting by firms. We derive the relation between inflation and unemployment and 
discuss how it is influenced by the presence of real wage rigidities. We show the nature of the 
tradeoff between inflation and unemployment stabilization, and we draw the implications for 
optimal monetary policy. 
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 1 Introduction
Two di®erent paradigms have come to dominate macroeconomics research over
the past decade.
On the one hand, the New Keynesian model (the NK model, for short) has
emerged as a powerful tool for monetary policy analysis in the presence of nominal
rigidities. Its adoption as the backbone of the medium-scale models currently
developed by many central banks and policy institutions is a clear re°ection of
its success. That success may be viewed as somewhat surprising given that the
existing versions of the NK paradigm typically do not generate movements in
unemployment, only voluntary movements in hours of work or employment.1
On the other hand, and independently, the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model
of search and matching (the DMP model, henceforth) has become a popular
framework for the analysis of labor market frictions, labor market dynamics, and
the implications of alternative policy interventions on unemployment.2 However,
its assumption of linear utility and its abstraction from nominal rigidities (or from
the existence of money, for that matter), has limited its usefulness for monetary
economists.
Our purpose in this paper is to provide a simple integration of these two strands
of research. We do so not for the sake of integration, but because we believe a
framework that combines the two is needed in order to accommodate simulta-
neously the following properties, which we hold to be relevant in industrialized
economies:
² Variations in unemployment are an important aspect of °uctuations, both
from a positive and a normative point of view.
² Labor market frictions and the nature of wage bargaining are central to
understanding movements in unemployment.
² The e®ects of technology and other real shocks are largely determined by
the nature of nominal rigidities and monetary policy, thus calling for an
1. Paradoxically, this was viewed as one of the main weaknesses of the RBC model (for ex-
ample, Summers (1991)), but was then exported to the NK model.
2. See Pissarides (2000) for a description of the DMP model.
2analysis of the consequences of alternative monetary policy rules for the
nature of °uctuations and the level of welfare.
In our model, frictions in labor markets are introduced by assuming the presence
of hiring costs, which increase with the degree of labor market tightness. We
start by showing that, under our assumptions on preferences and technology, the
constrained-e±cient allocation implies a constant level of unemployment.
Hiring costs, together with the fact that it takes time for unemployed workers to
¯nd a job, lead to a surplus associated with existing employment relationships,
with the wage determining how that surplus is split between ¯rms and work-
ers. We examine the consequences of two alternative wage setting structures for
equilibrium. Under Nash-bargaining we recover the property of a constant un-
employment rate which characterizes the constrained e±cient allocation, though
in the decentralized economy the implied level of unemployment is generally in-
e±cient. That result of constant equilibrium unemployment, which stands in
contrast to Pissarides (2000) and Shimer (2005), among others, comes from the
fact that, under our utility speci¯cation, the reservation wage, rather than being
constant, increases in proportion to consumption and thus with productivity. The
proportional increase in real wages and productivity leaves all labor market °ows
una®ected.
The above ¯nding leads us to consider the scope for and the implications of
real wage rigidity. As in Hall (2005), real wage rigidity a®ects hiring decisions,
but not employment in existing matches. We characterize the dynamic e®ects
of technology shocks on unemployment as a function of the degree of real wage
rigidity and other characteristics of the labor market. In particular, we show that
the size of unemployment °uctuations increases with the extent of real rigidities,
whereas the persistence of those °uctuations is higher in economies with more
sclerotic labor markets, i.e. markets with lower average job-¯nding and separation
rates.
Independently of their size and persistence, °uctuations of unemployment are
always ine±cient in our model. When we introduce nominal rigidities, mone-
tary policy can in°uence those °uctuations, motivating the analysis of the conse-
quences of alternative monetary policies. We ¯rst consider two extreme policies.
3We show that fully stabilizing in°ation leads to persistent movements in unem-
ployment in response to productivity shocks. As productivity shocks would not
a®ect unemployment in the constrained e±cient allocation, this implies that these
movements in unemployment, and by implication, strict in°ation targeting, are
suboptimal. The degree of persistence of unemployment depends on the under-
lying parameters of the economy. Interestingly, in light of the di®erence between
the US and European labor markets, the more sclerotic the labor market, the
more persistent are unemployment movements.
We then show that stabilizing unemployment can be achieved, but only at the
cost of variable in°ation, with in°ation increasing for some time in response to
an adverse technology shock.
We ¯nally derive the optimal monetary policy. The latter implies stabilizing a
weighted average of the variances of in°ation and of unemployment. It implies
therefore that an adverse productivity shock lead to an increase in in°ation and
an increase in unemployment for some time. Interestingly, while the implied re-
sponses of in°ation are similar under the U.S. and European calibrations, the
required °uctuations in unemployment are larger under the U.S. calibration. We
show how such optimal responses can be approximated reasonably well with a
simple Taylor-type rule which has the central bank adjust the short-term nomi-
nal rate in response to variations in in°ation and unemployment, with suitably
chosen response coe±cients.
We are not the ¯rst to point to the need for and attempt such an integration, with
relevant papers ranging from Merz (1995) to Christo®el and Linzert (2005). We
defer a presentation of the literature and of our relation to it to later in the paper.
Put simply, we see our contribution as the development of a simple, analytically
tractable model, which can be used to characterize the e®ects of di®erent shocks,
their relation to the underlying parameters of the economy, and to characterize
optimal monetary policy. Such a framework seems potentially useful in guiding
the development of larger and more realistic models.
The paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 sets up the basic model, leaving out nominal rigidities. We capture
4labor market frictions through external hiring costs. The latter are a function
of labor market tightness, de¯ned as the ratio of hires to the unemployment
pool. We then characterize the constrained-e±cient allocation, and show that
productivity shocks have no e®ect on unemployment. The source of this neutrality
is that income e®ects lead to changes in the wage proportional to changes in
productivity{as would be the case in an economy without labor market frictions.
Section 3 characterizes the decentralized equilibrium under alternative wage-
setting mechanisms. We ¯rst assume Nash bargained wages and derive the con-
ditions under which the economy replicates the constrained e±cient allocation.
We then show that, under Nash bargaining, the neutrality property continues to
hold. We then introduce real wage rigidities, and characterize the dynamic e®ects
of productivity shocks on unemployment.
Section 4 introduces nominal rigidities, in the form of staggering of price decisions
by ¯rms. We show how the model reduces, to a close approximation, to simple
relations between in°ation, marginal cost, and unemployment. We derive the re-
lation between in°ation and unemployment implied by the model, and contrast
it to the standard NK formulation. Put crudely, the model implies a signi¯cant
e®ect of both the level and the change in unemployment on in°ation, given ex-
pected in°ation.
Section 5 then turns to the implications of our framework for monetary policy.
It shows how stabilizing in°ation in response to productivity shocks leads to
large and ine±cient (given that constrained-e±cient unemployment is constant)
movements in unemployment. It shows how the persistence of unemployment is
higher in more sclerotic markets, markets in which the separation and the hiring
rate are lower. It derives optimal monetary policy, and the implied movements in
in°ation and unemployment.
Section 6 o®ers two calibrations of the model, one aimed at capturing the United
States, the other aimed at capturing Europe, with its more sclerotic labor mar-
kets. In each case, it presents the implications of pursuing either in°ation-stabilizing,
unemployment-stabilizing, or optimal monetary policy.
Section 7 indicates how our model relates to the existing{and rapidly growing{
5literature on the relative roles of labor market frictions, real wage rigidities, and
nominal price rigidities in shaping °uctuations.
Section 8 concludes.
2 A Simple Framework
2.1 Assumptions
Preferences
The representative household is made up of a continuum of members represented
by the unit interval. The household seeks to maximize
E0
X
¯
t
µ
logCt ¡ Â
Nt
1+Á
1 + Á
¶
(1)
where Ct is a CES function over a continuum of goods with elasticity of substi-
tution ², and Nt denotes the fraction of household members who are employed.
The latter must satisfy the constraint
0 · Nt · 1 (2)
Note that such a speci¯cation of utility di®ers from the one generally used in
the DMP model, where the marginal rate of substitution is generally assumed
to be constant. Our speci¯cation is, instead, one often used in models of the
business cycle, given its consistency with a balanced growth path and the direct
parameterization of the inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity by Á.
Technology
We assume a continuum of ¯rms indexed by i 2 [0;1], each producing a di®eren-
tiated good. All ¯rms have access to an identical technology
Yt(i) = At Nt(i)
6The variable At represents the state of technology, which is assumed to be com-
mon across ¯rms and to vary exogenously over time.
Employment in ¯rm i evolves according to
Nt(i) = (1 ¡ ±) Nt¡1(i) + Ht(i)
with ± 2 (0;1) is an exogenous separation rate, and Ht(i) represents the measure
of workers hired by ¯rm i in period t:
Labor Market
Flows and Timing.
At the beginning of period t there is a pool of jobless individuals who are avail-
able for hire, and whose size we denote by Ut. We refer to the latter variable as
beginning-of period unemployment (or just unemployment, for short). We make
assumptions below that guarantee full participation, i.e. at all times all individ-
uals are either employed or willing to work, given the prevailing labor market
conditions. Accordingly, we have
Ut = (1 ¡ Nt¡1 + ±Nt¡1 = 1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±)Nt¡1
Among those unemployed at the beginning of period t, a measure Ht ´
R 1
0 H(i) di
are hired and start working in the same period. Aggregate hiring evolves according
to
Ht = Nt ¡ (1 ¡ ±) Nt¡1 (3)
where Nt ´
R 1
0 N(i) di denotes aggregate employment.
We introduce an index of labor market tightness, xt, which we de¯ne as the ratio
of aggregate hires to the unemployment rate
xt ´
Ht
Ut
(4)
The tightness index xt is assumed to lie within the interval [0;1]. Only workers
7in the unemployment pool at the beginning of the period can be hired (Ht · Ut).
Note that, from the viewpoint of the unemployed, the index xt has an alternative
interpretation: It is the probability of being hired in period t, or, in other words,
the job-¯nding rate. Below we use the terms labor market tightness and job-
¯nding rate interchangeably.
Hiring costs.
Hiring labor is costly. Hiring costs for an individual ¯rm are given by GtHt(i),
expressed in terms of the CES bundle of goods. Gt represents the cost per hire,
which is independent of Ht(i) and taken as given by each individual ¯rm.
While Gt is taken as given by each ¯rm, it is an increasing function of labor
market tightness. Formally, we assume
Gt = At Bx
®
t
where ® ¸ 0 and B is a positive constant satisfying ±B < 1.
In our framework, the presence of hiring costs creates a friction in the labor
market similar to the cost of posting a vacancy and the time needed to ¯ll it in
the standard DMP model.3
For future reference, it is useful to de¯ne an alternative measure of unemployment,
denoted by ut, and given by the fraction of the population who are left without
a job after hiring takes place in period t. Formally, and given our assumption of
full participation, we have
ut = 1 ¡ Nt
3. In our model, vacancies are assumed to be ¯lled immediately by paying the hiring cost,
which is a function of labor market tightness. In the DMP model, the hiring cost is uncertain,
with its expected value corresponding to the (per period) cost of posting a vacancy times the
expected time to ¯ll it. This expected time is an increasing function of the ratio of vacancies to
unemployment which can be expressed in turn as a function of labor market tightness. Thus,
while the formalism used to capture the presence of hiring costs is di®erent, both approaches
have similar implications for ¯rms' hiring decisions and unemployment dynamics.
82.2 The Constrained E±cient Allocation
We derive the constrained-e±cient allocation by solving the problem of a benev-
olent social planner who faces the technological constraints and labor market
frictions that are present in the decentralized economy, but who internalizes the
e®ect of variations in labor market tightness on hiring costs and, hence, on the
resource constraint.
Given symmetry in preferences and technology, identical quantities of each good
will be produced and consumed in the e±cient allocation, i.e. Ct(i) = Ct for all
i 2 [0;1]. Furthermore, since labor market participation has no individual cost
but some social bene¯t (it lowers hiring costs, for any given level of employment
and hiring), the social planner will choose an allocation with full participation.
Hence the social planner maximizes (1) subject to (2) and the aggregate resource
constraint
Ct = At (Nt ¡ Bx
®
t Ht) (5)
where Ht and xt are de¯ned in (3) and (4).
The optimality condition for the social planner's problem can be written
as
ÂCtN
Á
t
At
· 1 ¡ (1 + ®)Bx
®
t
+¯(1 ¡ ±) Et
½
Ct
Ct+1
At+1
At
B (x
®
t+1 + ®x
®
t+1(1 ¡ xt+1))
¾
(6)
which must hold with equality if Nt < 1.
Note that the left hand side of (6) represents the marginal rate of substitution
between labor and consumption, whereas the right hand side captures the corre-
sponding marginal rate of transformation, both normalized by productivity At.
The latter has two components, captured by the two right-hand side terms. The
¯rst term corresponds to the additional output, net of hiring costs, generated
by a marginal employed worker. The second captures the savings in hiring costs
resulting from the reduced hiring needs in period t + 1.4
4. Note that hiring costs (normalized by productivity) at time t are given by Bx®
t Ht . The
9² Consider ¯rst the case no hiring costs (i.e. B = 0). In that case we have
Ct = AtNt , with the e±ciency condition (6) simplifying to
ÂN
1+Á
t · 1 (7)
thus implying a level of employment invariant to technology shocks. This
invariance is the result of o®setting income and substitution e®ects on
labor supply, and is standard in this class of models. Absent capital ac-
cumulation, consumption increases in proportion to productivity; given a
speci¯cation of preferences consistent with balanced growth, this increase
in consumption leads to an income e®ect that exactly o®sets the substitu-
tion e®ect.
² In the presence of hiring costs (B > 0), it is easy to check that the solution
to (6) still implies a constant level of employment,
N
¤ =
x¤
± + (1 ¡ ±)x¤ ´ N(x
¤)
where x¤ is the e±cient level for the tightness indicator, implicitly given
as the solution to
(1¡±Bx
®) ÂN(x)
1+Á · 1¡(1¡¯(1¡±))(1+®) Bx
®¡¯(1¡±)® Bx
1+® (8)
We assume an interior solution 0 < x¤ < 1 for the previous equation
(which must hence hold with equality). This in turn implies an interior
solution for employment and unemployment.5
The levels of consumption and output are proportional to productivity,
term Bx®
t in (6) captures the increase in hiring costs resulting from an additional hire, keeping
cost per hire unchanged. The term ®Bx®
t re°ects the e®ect on hiring costs of the change in
the tightness index xt induced by an additional hire (given Ht). The savings in hiring costs at
t+1 also have two components, both of which are proportional to 1¡±, the decline in required
hiring. The ¯rst component, Bx®
t+1, captures saving resulting from a lower Ht+1, given cost per
hire. The (negative) term ®Bx®
t (1 ¡ xt+1) adjusts the ¯rst component to take into account
the lower cost per hire brought about by a smaller xt+1 (the e®ect of lower required hires Ht+1
more than o®setting the smaller unemployment pool Ut+1).
5. A su±cient condition for an interior solution to (8) is given by Â(1 ¡ ±B) > 1 ¡ B. That
condition will be satis¯ed for any given values for ± and B, as long as Â is su±ciently close to
(but below) one.
10and given by C¤
t = AtN¤ (1 ¡ ±Bx¤®) and Y ¤
t = At N¤ .
Figure 1 shows graphically the determinants of the e±cient level of employment
in our model. The dashed (blue) lines represent the e±ciency condition in the
case of no hiring costs, while the solid (red) lines correspond to the model with
hiring costs. The upward sloping schedules starting o® the origin correspond
to the left hand side of (7) and (8), respectively, normalized by productivity.
They represent the (normalized) marginal rate of substitution Â(Ct=At)NÁ, as a
function of the (constant) level of employment N. Note that the red schedule is
uniformly below the blue one, due to the downward adjustment of consumption
by a factor (1 ¡ ±Bx®) resulting from the diversion of a fraction of output to
hiring costs. The schedules originating at (0,1) correspond to the right hand
side of (7) and (8), and capture the marginal rate of transformation between
employment and consumption (again, normalized by productivity), as a function
of employment. It is constant (and equal to one) in the case of no hiring costs, but
declining when hiring costs are present, capturing the fact that the increase in
employment needed to produce an additional unit of consumption is increasing,
as a result of the increasing level of hiring costs.
Having characterized the constrained-e±cient allocation we next turn our atten-
tion to the analysis of equilibrium in the decentralized economy. We consider ¯rst
the case of °exible prices.
3 Equilibrium under Flexible Prices
We start looking at the problem facing ¯rms. The solution to that problem de-
scribes the equilibrium, given the wage. Then we characterize the equilibrium
under two alternative models of wage determination.
3.1 Value Maximization by Firms
We ¯rst look at ¯rms' behavior, given the wage. Each ¯rm produces a di®eren-
tiated good, whose price it sets optimally each period, given demand. Formally,
11the ¯rm maximizes its value
Et
X
k
Qt;t+k (Pt+k(i)Yt+k(i) ¡ Pt+kWt+kNt+k(i) ¡ Pt+kGt+k Ht+k(i))
subject to the sequence of demand constraints
Yt(i) =
µ
Pt(i)
Pt
¶¡²
(Ct + GtHt)
for t = 0;1;2;...and taking as given the paths for the aggregate price level Pt, the
(real) wage Wt, and unit hiring costs Gt, and where Qt;t+k ´ ¯k Ct
Ct+k
Pt
Pt+k is the
stochastic discount factor for nominal payo®s.
The optimal price setting rule associated with the solution to the above problem
takes the form:
Pt(i) = M Pt MCt (9)
for all t, where M ´ ²
²¡1 is the optimal markup and
MCt =
Wt
At
+ Bx
®
t ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ±) Et
½
Ct
Ct+1
At+1
At
Bx
®
t+1
¾
(10)
is the ¯rm's (real) marginal cost. The latter depends on the wage normalized
by productivity, as well as on current and expected hiring costs. In particular,
marginal cost increases with current labor market tightness (due to the induced
higher hiring costs), but it decreases with the expected tightness index, since a
higher value for the latter implies larger savings in next period's hiring costs if
the ¯rm decides to increase its current employment.6
In a symmetric equilibrium we must have Pt(i) = Pt for all i 2 [0;1], and hence
(9) implies
MCt =
1
M
(11)
6. Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) were among the ¯rst to point out the implications of
hiring costs for the construction of marginal cost measures. They assumed hiring costs were
internal to the ¯rm and took the form of a quadratic function of the change in employment.
12for all t. Combining (10) and (11) and rearranging terms we obtain
Wt
At
=
1
M
¡ Bx
®
t + ¯(1 ¡ ±) Et
½
Ct
Ct+1
At+1
At
Bx
®
t+1
¾
(12)
A characterization of the equilibrium requires a speci¯cation of wage determina-
tion. We start by assuming Nash bargaining.
3.2 Equilibrium with Nash Bargained Wages
Let WN
t and WU
t denote the value to the representative household of having a
marginal member employed or unemployed at the beginning of period t, both ex-
pressed in consumption units. The value of a (marginal) employment relationship
is given by
W
N
t = Wt ¡ ÂCtN
'
t
+¯Et
½
Ct
Ct+1
[(1 ¡ ±(1 ¡ xt+1)) W
N
t+1 + ±(1 ¡ xt+1) W
U
t+1]
¾
i.e. the sum of the current payo®s (the wage minus the marginal rate of substi-
tution) and the discounted expected continuation values, with ±(1 ¡ xt+1) is the
probability of being unemployed in period t + 1, conditional on being employed
at time t.
The corresponding value from a member who remains unemployed after hiring
has taken place is:
W
U
t = ¯Et
½
Ct
Ct+1
[xt+1 W
N
t+1 + (1 ¡ xt+1) W
U
t+1]
¾
Combining both conditions we obtain the household's surplus from an established
job relationship:
W
N
t ¡ W
U
t = Wt ¡ ÂCtN
'
t
+¯(1 ¡ ±)Et
½
Ct
Ct+1
(1 ¡ xt+1) (W
N
t+1 ¡ W
U
t+1)
¾
(13)
13On the other hand the ¯rm's surplus from an established relationship is simply
given by the hiring cost Gt, since a ¯rm can always replace a worker at that cost
(with no search time required).
Letting # denote the relative weight of workers in the Nash bargain, the latter
requires
W
N
t ¡ W
U
t = #Gt
Imposing the latter condition in (13), and rearranging terms, we obtain the Nash
wage schedule:
Wt
At
=
ÂCtN
'
t
At
+ #Bx
®
t ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ±) Et
½
Ct
Ct+1
At+1
At
(1 ¡ xt+1) # Bx
®
t+1
¾
(14)
Equation (14) can now be used to substitute out Wt in (12), with the resulting
equilibrium under Nash bargaining being described by
ÂCtN
Á
t
At
=
1
M
¡ (1 + #) Bx
®
t
+¯(1 ¡ ±) Et
½
Ct
Ct+1
At+1
At
B(x
®
t+1 + #x
®
t+1(1 ¡ x
®
t+1))
¾
(15)
together with (3), (4), and (5), and given an exogenous process for technology.
It is easy to verify that the equilibrium under Nash bargained wages involves a
constant level of employment:
N
nb =
xnb
± + (1 ¡ ±)xnb ´ N(x
nb)
where xnb is the (constant) equilibrium job ¯nding rate, implicitly given by the
solution to:
Â(1¡±Bx
®) N(x)
1+Á =
1
M
¡(1¡¯(1¡±)) (1+#) Bx
® ¡¯(1¡±)# Bx
® (16)
14and where consumption and output are proportional to productivity, and given
by Cnb
t = At (1 ¡ ±B(xnb)®)Nnb and Y nb
t = At Nnb.
Finally, imposing the equilibrium conditions in (14), we obtain an expression for
the equilibrium Nash bargained wage:
W nb
t
At
=
1
M
¡ (1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ±)) B(x
nb)
® (17)
Note that, under our assumptions, productivity shocks are re°ected one-for-one
in the Nash bargained wage and thus have no e®ect on employment. That result
is independent of the elasticity of hiring costs with respect to xt or the relative
weight of workers in the Nash bargain. Such a result stands in contrast to Shimer
(2005). The reason is that, in line with the DMP framework, Shimer assumes
linear preferences and, hence, a marginal rate of substitution that is invariant
to changes in productivity. In that context, an increase in productivity leads to
a less than one-for-one increase in the Nash bargained wage, increasing pro¯ts
and inducing ¯rms to create new jobs. Shimer then shows that , under plausible
assumptions about the matching function and the relative bargaining strength of
workers and ¯rms, the employment response is likely to be small.
Our model allows instead for concave preferences and an endogenous marginal
rate of substitution between consumption and labor. Under our{standard{utility
speci¯cation, the Nash bargained wage increases one-for-one with the marginal
rate of substitution (which, in turn, increases with productivity), at any given
level of employment. Thus, changes in productivity have no e®ect on (un)employment,
independently of the hiring function, or the relative bargaining of workers and
¯rms.7
In a way analogous to the standard DMP model (see Hosios (1990)), one can
derive the conditions under which the equilibrium with Nash bargaining will cor-
7. Notice however that the equal increase in C and W is the result of both our speci¯cation of
preferences and the absence of capital accumulation. In the presence of capital accumulation,
employment would typically move, as it does in conventional real business cycle models.
15respond to the constrained e±cient allocation. To see this, we just need to com-
pare equilibrium condition (15) with condition (6) characterizing the constrained
e±cient (interior) allocation, and which we rewrite here for convenience:
ÂCtN
Á
t
At
= 1¡(1+®)Bx
®
t +¯(1¡±) Et
½
Ct
Ct+1
At+1
At
B(x
®
t+1 + ® x
®
t+1(1 ¡ xt+1))
¾
The two equations are equivalent if and only if the following two conditions are
satis¯ed:
First, M = 1 must hold. In other words we must have perfect competition in the
goods market (or alternatively, a production subsidy which exactly o®sets the
market power distortion).
Second, the workers' relative share of the surplus in the Nash bargain, #, must
coincide with the elasticity of the hiring cost function, ®. That requirement is
analogous to the Hosios condition found in the standard DMP framework, which
requires that the share of workers in the Nash bargain corresponds to the elasticity
of the matching function with respect to unemployment.
Figures 2 and 3 show graphically the factors behind the equilibrium under Nash
bargaining, and contrasts them with those underlying the constrained e±cient
allocation. The latter is represented by the intersection of the solid (red) lines,
which match those in Figure 1, already discussed above.
The downward sloping dashed line gives the ratio Wt=At implied by price set-
ting, equation (10), after imposing MCt = 1=M, and evaluated at a constant
employment allocation (constant over time). It can be interpreted as a labor de-
mand schedule, determining the (constant) level of employment consistent with
value maximization by ¯rms, as a function of the (productivity adjusted) wage.
Its slope becomes steeper with B, while its curvature increases with ®. Note also
that the schedule is °atter than its counterpart in the social planner problem, re-
°ecting the fact that in the decentralized economy ¯rms do not take into account
the e®ects of their hiring decisions on hiring costs.
The upward sloping dashed (green) line gives Wt=At implied by the Nash wage
16schedule (14), evaluated at a constant employment allocation. Its slope is increas-
ing in #, workers' relative weight in the Nash bargain. Its position above the red
line re°ects workers ' bargaining power.
Figure 2 represents an equilibrium characterized by ine±ciently high unemploy-
ment. This is a consequence of two factors: (i) a positive markup in the goods
market (which shifts the labor demand schedule downward), and (ii) too much
bargaining power by workers (# > ®) which makes the wage schedule too steep.
As a result we have Nnb < N¤, which implies an ine±ciently high unemployment
level.
Figure 3 illustrates graphically an equilibrium which leads to an e±cient unem-
ployment level. Two assumptions are needed for this, as discussed earlier. First,
we have M = 1. Second, the slope of the upward sloping wage schedule (deter-
mined by #) exactly o®sets the °atter labor demand schedule (whose slope is
determined by ®), making both intersect at N¤.
We restrict ourselves to equilibria in which the wage remains above the marginal
rate of substitution when the latter is evaluated at full employment:
Wt
At
> Â(1 ¡ ±Bxt
®) (18)
for all t. This condition guarantees full participation (as all the unemployed would
rather work than not), and that those without a job in any given period are
involuntarily unemployed. Thus, any ine±ciency in the equilibrium level of em-
ployment cannot be attributed to an ine±ciently low labor supply.8 Note that
it is only because of the presence of hiring costs that this is consistent with the
private e±ciency of existing employment relationships.9
8. This is in contrast with standard RBC or NK models, in which suboptimal levels of em-
ployment are also associated with an ine±ciently low labor supply.
9. In the absence of such frictions any unemployed worker would be willing to o®er his labor
services at a wage slightly lower than that of an employed worker (from a di®erent household),
which would bid down the wage up to the point where (18) held with equality.
173.3 Equilibrium under Real Wage Rigidities
As shown in the previous section, the equilibrium wage under Nash bargaining
moves one-for-one with productivity variations. As a result, changes in produc-
tivity do not a®ect ¯rms' incentives to change the rate at which workers are hired,
leaving unemployment unchanged. In our model, that invariance result holds in-
dependently of the elasticity of the hiring cost function and the Nash weights, and
hence, independently of whether the equilibrium supports the e±cient allocation
or not.
Following Hall (2005) and Blanchard and Gal¶ ³ (2005), we examine in this sec-
tion the consequences of real wage rigidity on employment and unemployment.
More precisely, and to keep the analysis as simple as possible, we assume a wage
schedule of the form
Wt = £ A
1¡°
t (19)
where ° 2 [0;1] is an index of real wage rigidities and £ > 0 is a constant that
determines the real wage, and hence employment in the steady state. Clearly, the
above formulation is meaningful only if technology is stationary, an assumption
we shall maintain here.
Note that for ° = 0 (and setting £ to the right hand side of (17)) the wage
schedule corresponds to the Nash bargaining wage, for any given relative share #.
At the other extreme, when ° = 1, equation (19) corresponds to the canonical ex-
ample of a rigid wage analyzed by Hall (2005). Also notice that if we assume that
£ = A° (1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ±)) g(x¤)) we allow for the possibility that the e±cient
steady state can be attained (if in addition M = 1.)
In addition to (18) we assume
Wt
At
<
1
M
(20)
for all t, which guarantees that ¯rms will want to employ some workers without
incurring any losses.
Combining (19) with (12) we obtain the following di®erence equation representing
18the equilibrium under real wage rigidities.
£ A
¡°
t =
1
M
¡ Bx
®
t + ¯(1 ¡ ±) Et
½
Ct
Ct+1
At+1
At
Bx
®
t+1
¾
(21)
The previous equation can be rearranged and solved forward to yield
Bx
®
t =
1 X
k=0
(¯(1 ¡ ±))
k Et
½
¤t;t+k
µ
1
M
¡ £ A
¡°
t+k
¶¾
where ¤t;t+k ´ (Ct=Ct+k) (At+k=At). We see that as long as wages are not fully
°exible (° > 0), variations in current or anticipated productivity will a®ect labor
market tightness (or, equivalently, the job ¯nding rate), with the size of the e®ect
being a decreasing function of the sensitivity of hiring costs to labor market
condition, as measured by parameter ®. In particular, a transitory increase in
productivity raises xt temporarily, which implies a decrease in unemployment,
followed by an eventual return to its normal level.
From the analysis above it follows that in the presence of real wage rigidities the
equilibrium will be characterized by ine±cient °uctuations in (un)employment.
We defer a full characterization of these °uctuations to later, after we have intro-
duced sticky prices and a role for monetary policy (Under a particular monetary
policy, namely in°ation targeting, the outcome for real variables is the same as
in the economy without nominal rigidities.)
4 Introducing Sticky Prices
Following much of the recent literature on monetary business cycle models, we
introduce sticky prices in our model with labor market frictions using the for-
malism due to Calvo (1983). Each period only a fraction 1 ¡ µ of ¯rms, selected
randomly, reset prices. The remaining ¯rms, with measure µ, keep their prices
unchanged.
19As shown in Appendix A, the optimal price setting rule for a ¯rm resetting prices
in period t is given by
Et
(
1 X
k=0
µ
k Qt;t+kYt+kjt (P
¤
t ¡ M Pt+k MCt+k)
)
= 0 (22)
where P ¤
t denotes the price newly set by at time t, Yt+kjt is the level of output in
period t + k for a ¯rm resetting its price in period t, and M ´ ²
²¡1 is the gross
desired markup. The real marginal cost is now given by
MCt = £ A
¡°
t + Bx
®
t ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ±) Et
½
Ct
Ct+1
At+1
At
Bx
®
t+1
¾
(23)
is the ¯rm's real marginal cost in period t.
The two previous equations embody the essence of our integration:
² The optimal price setting equation (22) takes the same form as in the
standard Calvo model, given the path of marginal costs: it leads ¯rms to
choose a price that is a weighted average of current and expected marginal
costs, with the weights being a function of µ, the price stickiness parameter.
² The marginal cost is, however, in°uenced by the presence of labor market
frictions (as captured by hiring cost parameters B and ®) and real wage
rigidities (measured by °).
To make progress requires log-linearizing the system, the task to which we turn.
4.1 Log-linearized Equilibrium Dynamics
The ¯rst step is to derive the equation characterizing in°ation. Log-linearization
around a zero in°ation steady state of the optimal price setting rule (22) and the
price index equation Pt = ((1 ¡ µ)(P ¤
t )1¡² + µ(Pt¡1)1¡²)
1
1¡², yields the standard
in°ation dynamics equation10
¼t = ¯ Etf¼t+1g + ¸ c mct (24)
10. See, e.g., Gal¶ ³ and Gertler (1999) for a derivation.
20where c mct ´ log(MCt=MC) = log(M MCt) represent the log deviations of real
marginal cost from its steady state value and ¸ ´ (1 ¡ ¯µ)(1 ¡ µ)=µ.
The second step is to derive the equation characterizing marginal cost. Letting
b xt = log(xt=x), b ct = log(Ct=C), and g ´ Bx® we can write the ¯rst-order Taylor
expansion of (23) as
c mct = ®gM b xt¡¯(1¡±)gM Etf(b ct¡at)¡(b ct+1¡at+1)+® b xt+1g¡©° at (25)
where © ´ MW=A = 1¡(1¡¯(1¡±))gM < 1 , and where we have normalized
the steady state productivity to unity (A = 1), letting at ´ logAt denote log
deviations of productivity from that steady state.
The third step, using (4) and (5), and letting b nt = log(Nt=N) is to derive the log
linear approximations for labor market tightness and consumption:
± b xt = b nt ¡ (1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ x) b nt¡1 (26)
b ct = at +
1 ¡ g
1 ¡ ±g
b nt +
g(1 ¡ ±)
1 ¡ ±g
b nt¡1 ¡
®g
1 ¡ ±g
± b xt (27)
The last step is to use the linearized ¯rst order conditions of the consumer (which
we have ignored until now) to get:
b ct = Etfb ct+1g ¡ (it ¡ Etf¼t+1g ¡ r
¤
t) (28)
where it denotes the short-term nominal interest rate and r¤
t ´ ½¡ at+Etfat+1g,
½ ´ ¡log¯, is the interest rate that supports the e±cient allocation.
The equilibrium of the model with wage rigidities is fully characterized by equa-
tions (24) to (28), together with a process for productivity, and a description of
monetary policy.
214.2 Approximate Log-linearized Dynamics
The characterization we have just given can however be simpli¯ed considerably
under two further approximations, which we view as reasonable:
The ¯rst is that hiring costs are small relative to output, so we can approximate
consumption by b ct = at + b nt.11
The second is that °uctuations in b xt are large relative to those in b nt, an approx-
imation which follows from (26) and the assumption of a low separation rate.12
Combined with our ¯rst assumption this allows one to drop the term b ct ¡at and
its lead from the expression for marginal cost (25).
These two approximations imply that we can rewrite the expression for marginal
cost, equation (25), as:
c mct = ®gM (b xt ¡ ¯ Etfb xt+1g) ¡ ©° at (29)
These approximations and this expression for marginal cost allow us in turn to
derive the following characterization of the economy:
² First, combining equation (29) with equation (24) gives a relation be-
tween in°ation, current labor market tightness and current and expected
productivity:
¼t = ®gM¸ b xt ¡ ¸©°
1 X
k=0
¯
k Etfat+kg (30)
Note that, despite the fact that expected in°ation does not appear in
(30), in°ation is a forward looking variable, through its dependence on
current and future at's, and current xt, which itself depends on current
and expected real marginal costs.13
11. More precisely we assume that g and ± are of the same order of magnitude as °uctuations
in b nt, implying that terms involving gb nt or ±b nt are of second order.
12. In other words, (26) implies that ± b xt is of the same order of magnitude as b nt and, hence,
it cannot be dropped from our linear approximations. We assume the same is true for terms
in g b xt (i.e., we assume that ± and g have the same order of magnitude).
13. This can be seen by solving (29) forward, to get ®gM b xt =
P1
k=0 ¯k Etfc mct+k+©° at+kg.
22² Second, let b ut ´ ut ¡ u denote the deviations of the unemployment rate
(after hiring) from its steady state value, u = (±(1 ¡ x))=(x + ±(1 ¡ x)).
Then, using equation (26) and the approximation b ut = ¡(1 ¡ u) b nt, gives
us a relation between labor market tightness and the unemployment rate:
b ut = (1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ x) b ut¡1 ¡ (1 ¡ u)± b xt (31)
² Third, using the log-linearized Euler equation of the consumer, together
with the approximation b ct = b nt+at, and the approximation b ut = ¡(1¡u)
b nt gives a relation between the unemployment rate and the real interest
rate:
b ut = Etfb ut+1g + (1 ¡ u) (it ¡ Etf¼t+1g ¡ r
¤
t) (32)
where, as before, it is the short-term nominal interest rate and r¤
t ´ ½ ¡
at +Etfat+1g, with ½ ´ ¡log¯. Note that (12) relates the unemployment
rate to current and anticipated deviations of the real interest rate from its
e±cient counterpart.
These equations, together with a speci¯cation of monetary policy, fully charac-
terize the equilibrium. We shall look at the implications of alternative monetary
policies in the next section. We limit ourselves here to a few remarks about the
relation between in°ation and unemployment:
Assume that productivity follows a stationary AR(1) process with autoregressive
parameter ½a 2 [0;1). We can then rewrite (30) as:
¼t = ®gM¸ b xt ¡ ª° at (33)
where ª ´ ¸©=(1 ¡ ¯½a) > 0.
Using the relation between labor market tightness and unemployment, we can
then derive a \Phillips curve" relation between in°ation and unemployment:
¼t = ¡· b ut + ·(1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ x) b ut¡1 ¡ ª° at (34)
23where · ´ ®gM¸=±(1 ¡ u). Or equivalently
¼t = ¡·(1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ x)) b ut ¡ ·(1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ x) ¢ut ¡ ª° at
which highlights the negative dependence of in°ation on both the level and the
change in the unemployment rate.
Given that constrained e±cient unemployment is constant, it would be best to
stabilize both unemployment and in°ation. Note however that, to the extent that
the wage does not adjust fully to productivity changes (° > 0), it is not possible
for the monetary authority to fully stabilize both unemployment and in°ation
simultaneously. There is, to use the terminology introduced by Blanchard and
Gal¶ ³ (2005), no divine coincidence.
The reason is the same as in our earlier paper, the fact that productivity shocks
a®ect the wedge between the natural rate|the unemployment rate that would
prevail absent nominal rigidities|and the constrained e±cient unemployment
rate. Stabilizing in°ation, which is equivalent to stabilizing unemployment at its
natural rate, does not deliver constant unemployment. Symmetrically, stabilizing
unemployment does not deliver constant in°ation.
The next section examines the implications of alternative monetary policy regimes.
5 Monetary Policy, Sticky Prices and Real Wage
Rigidities
5.1 Two Extreme Policies
We start by discussing two simple, but extreme, policies and their outcomes for
in°ation and unemployment, leaving the derivation of the optimal policy for the
next subsection.14 Given the paths of in°ation and unemployment implied by
each policy regime, equation (32) can be used to determine the interest rate rule
that would implement the corresponding allocation.
14. Throughout we rely on the log-linear approximations made in the previous section.
24Unemployment stabilization. Recall that in the constrained e±cient alloca-
tion unemployment is constant. A policy that seeks to stabilize the gap between
unemployment and its e±cient level requires therefore that b ut = b nt = b xt = 0 for
all t, and hence
¼t = ¡ª° at
Note that, given ª (which is a function of underlying parameters other than °),
the size of the implied °uctuations in in°ation is increasing in the degree of wage
rigidities °.15
Strict in°ation targeting. Setting ¼t = 0 in (34) we can determine the evolu-
tion of the unemployment rate under strict in°ation targeting:
b ut = (1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ x) b ut¡1 ¡ (ª°=·) at (35)
Note that the previous equation also characterizes the evolution of unemployment
under °exible prices, since the allocation consistent with price stability replicates
the one associated with the °exible price equilibrium.16
Equation (35) shows that under a strict in°ation targeting policy, the unem-
ployment rate will display some intrinsic persistence, i.e. some serial correlation
beyond that inherited from productivity. The degree of intrinsic persistence de-
pends critically on the separation rate ± and the steady state job ¯nding rate x,
while the amplitude of °uctuations are increasing in °, the degree of real rigidi-
ties. In a sclerotic labor market, with high average unemployment and a a low
average job ¯nding rate x, unemployment will display strong persistence, well
beyond that inherited from productivity. More active labor markets, on the other
15. Intuitively, the stabilization of unemployment (and hiring costs) makes the real marginal
cost vary with productivity, according to c mct = ¡©° at, generating °uctuations in in°ation.
The amplitude of those °uctuations is increasing in the degree of wage rigidities ° and in the
persistence of the shock to productivity ½a, but decreasing in the degree of nominal rigidities
(which is inversely related to ¸).
16. The full stabilization of prices requires that markups are stabilized at their desired level or,
equivalently, that the real marginal cost remains constant at its steady state level, i.e. c mct = 0
for all t. In the presence of less than one-for-one adjustment of wages to changes in productivity,
that requires an appropriate adjustment in the degree of labor market tightness and, hence, in
unemployment.
25hand, will be characterized by a high average job ¯nding rate, and will display less
persistent unemployment °uctuations under the stric in°ation targeting policy.17
5.2 Optimal Monetary Policy
In this section we analyze the nature of the optimal monetary policy in our model.
To simplify the analysis and avoid well understood but peripheral issues, we as-
sume the unemployment °uctuates around a steady state value which corresponds
to that of the constrained e±cient allocation. As shown in Appendix B, a second
order approximation to the welfare losses of the representative household around
that steady state is proportional to:
E0
1 X
t=0
¯
t (¼
2
t + ®u b u
2
t) (36)
where ®u ´ ¸(1 + Á)Â(N¤)Á¡1=² > 0:
Hence the monetary authority will seek to minimize (36) subject to the sequence
of equilibrium constraints given by (34), for t = 0;1;2;::: Clearly, and given the
form of the welfare loss function the optimal policy will be somewhere between
the two extreme policies discussed above.
The ¯rst order conditions for the above problem take the following form:
¼t = ³t
®u b ut = · ³t ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ x)· Etf³t+1g
for t = 0;1;2;:::where ³t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with period t con-
straint. Combining both conditions to eliminate the multiplier gives the optimal
targeting rule:18
¼t = ¯(1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ x) Etf¼t+1g + (®u=·) b ut (37)
17. The hypothesis that more sclerotic markets might lead to more persistence to unemploy-
ment was explored empirically by Barro (1988).
18. Note that when ®u corresponds to utility maximization we have ®u
· =
±(1+Á)(1¡u)
Á
®g²
26Equivalently, and solving forward,
¼t =
³®u
·
´ 1 X
t=0
(¯(1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ x))
k Etfb ut+kg (38)
Hence in response to an adverse productivity shock, the central bank should
partly accommodate the in°ationary pressures, while letting unemployment in-
crease up to the point where its anticipated path satis¯es (38).
Combining (37) and (34) we can derive a second order di®erence equation describ-
ing the optimal evolution of the unemployment rate as a function of productivity:
b ut = q b ut¡1 + ¯q Etfb ut+1g ¡ s at
where
q ´
·2(1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ x)
®u + ·2(1 + ¯(1 ¡ ±)2(1 ¡ x)2)
2 (0;1)
and
s ´
·(1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ x)½a)ª°
®u + ·2(1 + ¯(1 ¡ ±)2(1 ¡ x)2)
> 0
The unique stationary solution to that di®erence equation is given by:
b ut = Ãu b ut¡1 ¡ Ãa at (39)
where
Ãu ´
1 ¡
p
1 ¡ 4¯q2
2q¯
2 (0;1); Ãa ´
s
1 ¡ ¯q(Ãu + ½a)
> 0
Given (39), the behavior of in°ation under the optimal policy is then determined
by (37), and it can be represented by the following linear function of unemploy-
ment and productivity:
¼t = 'u b ut ¡ 'a at
where
'u ´
®u
·(1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ x)(1 ¡ ±)Ãu)
> 0; 'a ´
¯(1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ x)'uÃa½a
·(1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ x)(1 ¡ ±)Ãu)
> 0
276 Calibration and Quantitative Analysis
In order to illustrate the quantitative properties of our model we analyze the
responses of in°ation and unemployment to a productivity shock implied by the
three monetary policy regimes introduced above. We start by discussing our cal-
ibration of the model's parameters.
We take each period to correspond to a quarter. For the parameters describing
preferences we assume values commonly found in the literature: ¯ = 0:99 , Á = 1,
² = 6 (implying a gross steady state markup M = 1:2).
We set µ = 2=3, which implies an average duration of prices of three quarters,
which is roughly consistent with the micro and macro evidence on price setting. At
this point we do not have any hard evidence on the degree of real wage rigidities,
so we set the degree of real wage rigidities, °, equal to 0:5, the midpoint in the
admissible range.19
In order to calibrate ® we exploit a simple mapping between our model and the
standard DMP model. In the latter, the expected cost per hire is proportional to
the expected duration of a vacancy, which in the steady state is given by V=H
where V denotes the number of vacancies. Assuming a matching function of the
form H = Z U´V 1¡´ , we have V=H = Z
1
´¡1(H=U)
´
1¡´. Hence, parameter ® in our
hiring cost function corresponds to ´=(1¡´) in the DMP model. Since estimates
of ´ are typically close to 1=2 , we assume ® = 1 in our baseline calibration.
Below we analyze two di®erent calibrations for the steady state job ¯nding rate
and unemployment rate, which we think of as capturing the characteristics of the
US and the European labor markets respectively.
We think of our baseline calibration as capturing the US. We set the job ¯nding
rate x equal to 0:7. This corresponds, approximately, to a monthly rate of 0:3
19. Under an (overly) strict interpretation of our model, ° can be obtained through a regression
of real wage growth on productivity growth|which is exogenous in our model. Such a regression
yields a coe±cient between 0.3 and 0.4, so a value for ° between 0.6 and 0.7. Stepping outside
our model, obvious caveats apply, from the measurement of productivity growth, to the direction
of causality.
28consistent with U.S. evidence.20. In our baseline calibration we set u to 0:05,
which is consistent with the average unemployment rate in the U.S. Given x and
u we can determine the separation rate using the relation ± = ux=((1¡u)(1¡x)).
This yields a value for ± roughly equal to 0:12.
We choose our alternative calibration to capture the more sclerotic European
labor market. Thus we assume x = 0:25 (which is roughly consistent with a
monthly rate of 0:1) and u = 0:1, values in line with evidence for the European
Union over the past two decades. The implied separation rate is ± = 0:04.
Finally, we need to set a value for B, which determines the level of hiring costs.
Notice that, in the steady state, hiring costs represent a fraction ±g = ±Bx® of
GDP. Lacking any direct evidence on the latter we choose B so that under our
baseline calibration that fraction is one percent of GDP, which seems a plausible
upper bound. This implies B = 0:01=(0:12)(0:7) ' 0:11
Note that the above calibrated parameters, combined with the assumption of an
e±cient steady state, allow us to pin down Â. Speci¯cally, (8) implies Â ' 1:03
under the our baseline/U.S.calibration, and Â ' 1:22 under the European one.21
6.1 The Dynamic E®ects of Productivity Shocks
Figures 4 and 5 summarize the e®ects of a productivity shock under alternative
policies. In Figure 4 we assume a purely transitory shock (½a = 0), which allows
us to isolate the model's intrinsic persistence, whereas in Figure 5 we assume
½a = 0:9, a more realistic degree of persistence. In both ¯gures we display the
responses for both the U.S. and European labor market calibrations. In all cases
we report responses to a one percent decline in productivity, and expressed in
percent terms.
20. See Blanchard (2006). We compute the equivalent quarterly rate as xm + (1 ¡ xm)xm +
(1 ¡ xm)2xm, where xm is the monthly job ¯nding rate.
21. Note that our model can only account for a higher e±cient steady state unemployment rate
in Europe by assuming a larger disutility of labor. Alternatively, we could have assumed an
e±cient steady state only for the U.S., and impose the implied Â to the European calibration
as well. In that case, however, the steady state unemployment would not be e±cient.and an
additional linear term would appear in the loss function, which would render our log-linear
approximation to the equilibrium conditions insu±cient.
29We begin by discussing the case of a transitory shock. As shown in Figure 4, and
implied by the analysis above, under a policy that stabilizes unemployment, a
transitory shock to productivity has a very limited impact on in°ation, which rises
less than ten basis points under both calibrations, and displays no persistence.
The size of the e®ect is almost identical for both calibrations.
Under in°ation stabilization on the other hand, unemployment rises by about 70
basis points on impact in the U.S. calibration, 60 basis points in the European
one. Most interestingly, and as discussed above, unemployment remains above
its initial value well after the shock has vanished, with the persistence being
signi¯cantly greater under the European calibration. The di®erence in persistence
is a consequence of both a lower job ¯nding rate and a smaller separation rate in
Europe.
Not surprisingly, the optimal policy strikes a balance between the two, and
achieves a highly muted response of both in°ation and unemployment. The dif-
ferences in the responses across the two calibrations is very small, with only a
slightly smaller in°ation response of in°ation in the U.S. calibration being de-
tectable on the graph. Interestingly, the persistence in both variables is negligible
(though not zero) under both calibrations. Perhaps the most salient feature of
the exercise is the substantial reduction in unemployment volatility under the
optimal policy relative to a constant in°ation policy, achieved at a small cost in
terms of additional in°ation volatility.
Figure 5 displays analogous results, under the assumption that ½a = 0:9, a more
realistic degree of persistence. Now the size of the response of in°ation is ampli¯ed
substantially under the constant unemployment policy, with an increase of more
than 70 basis points on impact under both calibrations. This ampli¯cation e®ect
re°ects the forward looking nature of in°ation and the persistent e®ects on real
marginal costs generated by the interaction of the shock and real wage rigidities.
Note also that in°ation inherits the persistence of the shock.
Given the strong in°ationary pressures generated by a persistent adverse pro-
ductivity shock, it is not surprising that fully stabilizing in°ation in the face of
those pressures would require large movements in unemployment. This is con-
30¯rmed by our results, which point to an increase of 6:5 percentage points (!) in
the unemployment rate under the U.S. calibration. Interestingly, the unemploy-
ment increase under the European calibration is signi¯cantly smaller (though still
huge): 5:2 percentage points. In both cases unemployment is highly persistent,
with its response displaying a prominent hump-shaped pattern. The degree of
persistence is remarkably larger under the European calibration, for the same
reasons discussed earlier.
Under the optimal policy, the increase in unemployment on impact is about 1
percentage point under the U.S. calibration, half that size under the European
one. Note that the size of such responses is several times smaller than under
in°ation targeting. The price for having a smoother unemployment path is per-
sistently higher in°ation, with the latter variable increasing by about 60 basis
points under both calibrations.
Interestingly, while the path of in°ation implied by the optimal policy is roughly
the same under both calibrations, the increase in unemployment is substantially
smaller under the European calibration. The explanation for that result has to
do with the fact that ·{the coe±cient measuring the sensitivity of in°ation to
unemployment changes{is smaller under the U.S. calibration , thus implying a
larger sacri¯ce ratio. This is in turn a consequence of a higher separation rate
implied by our calibration (0:12 vs. 0:04)
Why is the Phillips curve °atter in an economy with a high separation rate? The
reason is that the sensitivity of marginal cost to changes in the unemployment
rate depends on the e®ects of the latter on the tightness index x. As equation (26)
makes clear, the higher is the separation rate the smaller is the e®ect of a given
change in unemployment on x. This is in turn explained by a lower elasticity of
aggregate hirings with respect to unemployment when ± is high: intuitively, in
an economy with high turnover, a change in employment of a given size can be
absorbed without much upsetting of the labor market.
Figure 6 illustrates how the optimal responses of in°ation and unemployment to
a productivity shock can be approximated fairly well by having the central bank
31follow a simple Taylor-type rule of the form
it = ½ + Á¼ ¼t ¡ Áu b ut
Casual experimentation with alternative calibrations of the rule suggest that
Á¼ = 1:5 and Áu = 0:2 work ¯ne at approximating the optimal responses under
the U.S. calibration. On the other hand, a rule with Á¼ = 1:5 and Áu = 0:6 does a
good job at approximating the optimal responses under the European calibration.
Notice that in the latter case the larger coe±cient on unemployment is consistent
with the smaller required variation in unemployment.
7 Relation to the Literature
Our model combines four main elements: (1) standard preferences (concave utility
of consumption and leisure), (2) labor market frictions, (3) real wage rigidities,
(4) price staggering. As a result, it is related to a large and rapidly growing
literature.
Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996) were the ¯rst to integrate (1) and (2), by
introducing labor market frictions in an otherwise standard RBC model. In par-
ticular, Merz derived the conditions under which Nash bargaining would or would
not deliver the constrained-e±cient allocation. Both models are richer than ours
in allowing for capital accumulation, and in the case of Andolfatto, for both an
extensive margin (through hiring) and an intensive margin (through adjustment
of hours) for labor. In both cases, the focus was on the dynamic e®ects of tech-
nological shocks, and in both cases, the model was solved through simulations.
Ch¶ eron and Langot (2000), Walsh (2003) and Trigari (2006, with a draft circu-
lated in 2003), integrate (1), (2) and (4), by allowing for Calvo nominal price
setting by ¯rms. Their models are again much richer than ours. Walsh allows for
endogenous separations. Ch¶ eron and Langot, as well as Trigari allow for both an
extensive and an intensive margin for labor, with e±cient Nash bargaining over
hours and the wage. In addition Trigari considers \right to manage" bargaining,
32with the ¯rm choosing freely hours ex-post. Those models are too large to be
analytically tractable, and are solved through simulations. The focus of Walsh
and Trigari's papers is on the dynamic e®ects of nominal shocks, while Ch¶ eron
and Langot study the ability of the model with both technology and monetary
shocks to generate a Beveridge curve as well as a Phillips curve. More recent
papers, by Walsh (2005), Trigari (2005), Moyen and Sahuc (2005), and Andr¶ es et
al. (2006) among others, introduce a number of extensions, from habit persistence
in preferences, to capital accumulation, to the implications of Taylor rules. The
models in these papers are relatively complex DSGE models, which need to be
studied through calibration and simulations.
Shimer (2005) and Hall (2005) were the ¯rst to integrate (2) and (3). Shimer ar-
gued that, in the standard DMP model, wages were too °exible, and the response
of unemployment to technological shocks was too small. Hall (2005) showed ¯rst
the scope for and then the implications of real wage rigidities in that class of mod-
els. These models di®er from ours because of their assumption of linear preferences
(in addition to their being real models). We have shown earlier the implications
of this di®erence. But our results, using a standard utility speci¯cation, reinforce
their conclusion that real wage rigidities are needed to explain °uctuations.
Gertler and Trigari (2005) have explored the implications of integrating (1), (2)
and (3). Their model allows for standard preferences, labor market frictions, and
real wage staggering a la Calvo. Being a real model, however, it has no room
for nominal rigidities. Their model is again too complex to be solved analyti-
cally, and is studied through simulations. Their focus is on the dynamic e®ects
of technological shocks.
The paper closest to ours is by Christo®el and Linzert (2005). Like us, it integrates
(1) to (4), with standard preferences, labor market frictions, real wage rigidities,
and nominal price staggering by ¯rms. Again, their model is substantially more
complex than ours, allowing for both extensive and intensive margins for labor,
and either e±cient Nash bargaining, or right to manage. The model is solved
through simulations. The main focus is on in°ation persistence in response to
monetary policy shocks.
33This brief (and surely partial) review makes clear that we cannot claim originality
of purpose. Our aim was to develop and present a structure simple enough that
its solution can be characterized analytically, the dynamic e®ects of shocks can
be related to the underlying parameters, and optimal policy can be derived.
In contrast, much of the related literature described above falls short of any
normative analysis, due to the complexity of the models involved. We think that
our analytical model is a needed step in the development of these more complex
models.
8 Conclusions
We have constructed a model with labor market frictions, real wage rigidities,
and staggered price setting. The model thus integrates the key elements of the
New Keynesian framework and the Diamond-Mortensen-Pisarrides search model
of labor market °ows.
The three ingredients above are all needed if one is to explain movements in
unemployment, the e®ects of changes in productivity on the economy, and the
role of monetary policy in shaping those e®ects.
We have derived the constrained-e±cient allocation, and the equilibrium in the
decentralized economy in the presence of real wage rigidities and sticky prices.
The optimal monetary policy has been shown to minimize a weighted average of
unemployment and in°ation °uctuations.
The extent of real wage rigidities determines the amplitude of unemployment °uc-
tuations under the optimal policy. Furthermore, unemployment displays intrinsic
persistence, i.e. persistence beyond that inherited from productivity. The degree
of persistence is decreasing in the job ¯nding rate. Hence, the more sclerotic is
the labor market the more persistence is unemployment.
In the presence of real wage rigidities, strict in°ation targeting does not deliver
the best monetary policy. As in Blanchard and Gali (2005), the reason is that
distortions vary with shocks. The best policy implies some accommodation of
in°ation, and comes with some persistent °uctuations in unemployment.
34Appendix A: Derivation of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve with
Hiring Costs
The Optimal Price Setting Problem
Let Xt+kjt denote the value of a variable X in period t + k for a ¯rm that last
reset its price in period t. P ¤
t denotes the price set by this ¯rm at time t. Qt;t+k ´
¯k Ct
Ct+k
Pt
Pt+k is now the stochastic discount factor for nominal payo®s. A ¯rm
resetting prices in period t maximizes its value, given by
Vt(Nt¡1jt) = max
P¤
t
Et
1 X
k=0
µ
k Qt;t+k [P
¤
t Yt+kjt ¡ Pt+k(Wt+kNt+kjt + Gt+kHt+kjt)]
+ (1 ¡ µ) Et
1 X
k=0
µ
k Qt;t+k+1 Vt+k+1(Nt+kjt) (40)
subject to
Yt+kjt = At+kNt+kjk (41)
Yt+kjt =
µ
P ¤
t
Pt+k
¶¡²
(Ct+k + Gt+kHt+k) (42)
where Ht+kjt = Nt+kjt ¡ (1 ¡ ±) Nt+k¡1jt and Pt ´
³R 1
0 Pt(j)1¡² dj
´ 1
1¡²
is the
aggregate price index.
Notice that, in contrast with the Calvo model without hiring costs, the payo®s
associated with the current price decision now include a term corresponding to
the period after the end of the life of the newly set price. That term takes the form
of a weighted average of the value of the ¯rm at the time or resetting the price,
with the weights, (1 ¡µ) µk , corresponding to the probability that this happens
at each possible horizon. The reason is that P ¤
t will still have some in°uence on
the payo®'s of that period through its e®ect on inherited employment and, hence,
on hiring requirements.
Even though the pro¯ts of a ¯rm resetting its price at time t will be be in°uenced
by its lagged employment, the price decision will be independent of past variables.
That result, which allows our model to preserve all the aggregation properties of
35the basic Calvo framework, follows from our assumption of linear hiring costs at
the ¯rm level.
Di®erentiating objective function (40) with respect to P ¤
t and using constraints
(41) and (42), as well as the envelope property V 0
t(Nt¡1jt) = (1 ¡ ±) PtGt (which
must hold for all t) we obtain the optimality condition
0 = Et
1 X
k=0
µ
k Qt;t+k
·
Yt+kjt (1 ¡ ²) + ²
Pt+kWt+k
P ¤
t
Nt+kjt ¡ Pt+kGt+k
dHt+kjt
dP ¤
t
¸
¡²(1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ µ) Et
1 X
k=0
µ
k Qt;t+k+1
Pt+k+1Gt++k+1
P ¤
t
Nt+kjt
where
dHt+kjt
dP ¤
t
=
1
At+k
dYt+kjt
dP ¤
t
¡ (1 ¡ ±)
1
At+k¡1
dYt+k¡1jt
dP ¤
t
= ¡
²
P ¤
t
£
Nt+kjt ¡ (1 ¡ ±)Nt+k¡1jt
¤
for k = 1;2;3;::and
dHtjt
dP¤
t = ¡ ²
P¤
t Ntjt for k = 0.
Collecting terms and letting M ´ ²
²¡1 denote the gross desired markup we have
0 = Et
1 X
k=0
µ
kQt;t+k[Yt+kjt
¡M
Pt+k
P ¤
t
µ
Wt+k + Gt+k ¡ (1 ¡ ±)Qt+k;t+k+1
Pt+k+1
Pt+k
Gt+k+1
¶
Nt+kjt]
which can be seen to be independent of Nt¡1jt, thus implying that all ¯rms re-
setting their price in period t will choose the same price P ¤
t , independently of
their price history (and, hence, their employment in the previous period). This
is a consequence of our assumption of hiring costs which are linear in the ¯rm¶s
hiring level, thus implying that lagged employment does not a®ect marginal cost
or marginal revenue (even though it will in°uence the level of pro¯ts). In turn,
that property allows us to preserve the aggregation properties of the basic Calvo
model.
36Rearranging terms we have
0 = Et
1 X
k=0
µ
k Qt;t+k Yt+kjt (P
¤
t ¡ M Pt+k MCt+k)
where
MCt ´
Wt
At
+ g(xt) ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ±) Et
½
u0(Ct+1)
u0(Ct)
At+1
At
g(xt+1)
¾
37Appendix B: Derivation of the Welfare Loss Function
Under our assumed utility speci¯cation we have:
u(Ct) = logCt = c + b ct
and
v(Nt) = Â
N
1+Á
t
1 + Á
' Â
N1+Á
1 + Á
+ ÂN
1+Á
µ
Nt ¡ N
N
¶
+
1
2
ÁÂN
1+Á
µ
Nt ¡ N
N
¶2
' Â
N1+Á
1 + Á
+ ÂN
1+Á b nt +
1
2
(1 + Á)ÂN
1+Á b n
2
t
where we have made use of the fact that up to second order Nt¡N
N ' b nt + 1
2 b n2
t.
Hence, the deviation of period utility from its steady state value, denoted by Ut;
is given by
Ut ' b ct ¡ ÂN
1+Á b nt +
1
2
(1 + Á)ÂN
1+Á b n
2
t (43)
Next we derive an equation that relates, up to a second order approximation, b ct
and b nt. Market clearing for good i requires that At(Nt(i) ¡ g(xt)Ht(i)) = Ct(i).
Integrating over i yields:
At (Nt ¡ g(xt) Ht) =
Z 1
0
Ct(i) di
= Ct
Z 1
0
Ct(i)
Ct
di
= Ct
Z 1
0
µ
Pt(i)
Pt
¶¡²
di
´ Ct Dt
where Dt ´
R 1
0
³
Pt(i)
Pt
´¡²
di.
Thus we can write
CtDt
AtNt
¡ 1 = ¡g(xt)
Ht
Nt
38Notice that the right-hand side term equals ¡±g in the steady state. Hence, under
our assumption on the order of magnitude of ± and g, it is already of second order
relative to employment °uctuations. Thus it su±ces to derive a ¯rst-order Taylor
expansion:
g(xt)
Ht
Nt
' ±g + ®g± b xt + g(1 ¡ ±) b nt ¡ g(1 ¡ ±) b nt¡1
' ±g + g(1 ¡ ± + ®) b nt ¡ g(1 ¡ ±)(1 + ®(1 ¡ x)) b nt¡1
where we have made use of equation (26) as well as the fact that g0x = ®g .
Hence we have
CtDt
AtNt(1 ¡ ±g)
' 1 ¡
g(1 ¡ ± + ®)
1 ¡ ±g
b nt +
g(1 ¡ ±)(1 + ®(1 ¡ x))
1 ¡ ±g
b nt¡1
Taking logs on both sides, and realizing that the terms in b nt and b nt¡1 are pre-
multiplied by g and hence are already of second order:
b ct = at ¡ dt +
1 ¡ g(1 + ®)
1 ¡ ±g
b nt +
g(1 ¡ ±)(1 + ®(1 ¡ x))
1 ¡ ±g
b nt¡1 (44)
Lemma: up to a second order approximation, dt ´ logDt ' ²
2 vari(pt(i)).
Proof: see appendix C.
Using (43) and (44), we can write the expected discounted sum of period utilities
as follows:
E0
1 X
t=0
¯
t Ut '
²
2
E0
1 X
t=0
¯
t vari(pt(i)) ¡
1
2
(1 + Á)ÂN
1+Á E0
1 X
t=0
¯
t b n
2
t
+E0
1 X
t=0
¯
t
µ
1 ¡ g(1 + ®) + ¯(1 ¡ ±)g(1 + ®(1 ¡ x))
1 ¡ ±g
¡ ÂN
1+Á
¶
b nt
+t:i:p:
Assuming that the economy °uctuates around the e±cient steady state, we can
39use (8) to show that the coe±cient on b nt equals zero.
The following result allows us to express the cross-sectional variance of prices as
a function of in°ation:
Lemma:
P1
t=0 ¯t vari(pt(i)) = 1
¸
P1
t=0 ¯t ¼2
t
Proof: Woodford (2003)
Combining the previous results, together with our de¯nition of the unemployment
rate ut, we can write the welfare losses from °uctuations around the e±cient
steady state (ignoring terms independent of policy or lagged as
L ´
1
2
E0
1 X
t=0
¯
t
h²
¸
¼
2
t + (1 + Á)Â(1 ¡ u
¤)
Á¡1 b u
2
t
i
=
1
2
²
¸
E0
1 X
t=0
¯
t (¼
2
t + ®u b u
2
t)
where ®u ´ (¸(1 + Á)Â(1 ¡ u¤)Á¡1)=² > 0:
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From the de¯nition of the price index, in a neighborhood of the zero in°ation
steady state:
1 =
Z 1
0
µ
Pt(i)
Pt
¶1¡²
di
=
Z 1
0
expf(1 ¡ ²) (pt(i) ¡ pt)g di
' 1 + (1 ¡ ²)
Z 1
0
(pt(i) ¡ pt) di +
(1 ¡ ²)2
2
Z 1
0
(pt(i) ¡ pt)
2 di
thus implying
pt '
Z 1
0
pt(i) di +
(1 ¡ ²)
2
Z 1
0
(pt(i) ¡ pt)
2 di
By de¯nition,
Dt ´
Z 1
0
µ
Pt(i)
Pt
¶¡²
di
=
Z 1
0
expf¡² (pt(i) ¡ pt)g di
' 1 ¡ ²
Z 1
0
(pt(i) ¡ pt) di +
²2
2
Z 1
0
(pt(i) ¡ pt)
2 di
' 1 +
²(1 ¡ ²)
2
Z 1
0
(pt(i) ¡ pt)
2 di +
²2
2
Z 1
0
(pt(i) ¡ pt)
2 di
= 1 +
²
2
Z 1
0
(pt(i) ¡ pt)
2 di
It follows that dt ' (²=2) vari(pt(i)) up to a second order approximation.
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